

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05
PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SSM-03 AID-05
SIG-01 DHA-05 /116 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:MSTERNER:YW
APPROVED BY NEA:ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
AF:KSMITH
JSHINN
EA:GMILLER

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P R 161816Z OCT 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
CONFIDENTIAL

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AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

1. ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR BRIEFINGS BY HOST GOVERNMENTS ON STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO IMPART NEW MOVEMENT TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, USDEL NATO MAY ALSO USE THIS AS BASIS FOR BRIEFING NAC.

2. BY WAY OF PUTTING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IN CONTEXT, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY'S FIRST TRIP TO AREA, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS BETWEEN MIDDLE EAST LEADERS
CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THE PRESIDENT, HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON EXPLORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO SEE IF SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT COULD BE DEFINED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BY TIME MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN MINISTERS CAME TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER, WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT COULD BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY NOW TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IS TO BRING THE PARTIES INTO NEGOTIATION WITH EACH OTHER AT GENEVA AND START A PROCESS OF GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE. TIME HAD COME, THEREFORE, TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE.

3. U.S. DEVELOPED SOME IDEAS ON TWO KEY QUESTIONS ON WHICH THERE HAS TO BE SOME AGREEMENT IN ORDER FOR GENEVA TO MEET: HOW PALESTINIANS ARE TO BE REPRESENTED, AND STRUCTURE OF CONFERENCE. PAPER WHICH WAS USED AS BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS EVOLVED IN LIGHT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS, IN WHICH WE SOUGHT FORMULATIONS TO MEET MINIMAL VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES. THERE WERE WIDE DIVERGENCIES; ISRAEL MADE CLEAR IT WAS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO PLO PRESENCE IN ANY FORM WHATEVER AND ARABS WERE EQUALLY ADAMANT IN INSISTING PLO MUST BE REPRESENTED. ON QUESTION OF ORGANIZATION, ISRAEL AND EGYPT PREFERRED FORMAT OF BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA AND JORDAN PREFERRED MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUPS ORGANIZED TO DEAL

WITH FUNCTIONAL ISSUES AND INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES PRESENT AT CONFERENCE.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IDEA OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION, IN WHICH PALESTINIANS WOULD BE PRESENT, SEEMED TO US TO OFFER POSSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING IMPASSE. ON QUESTION OF STRUCTURE OF CONFERENCE, WE FELT THAT COMBINATION OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE BEST WAY. SOME ISSUES LOGICALLY WERE BILATERAL, CONFIDENTIAL

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SUCH AS CONSIDERATION OF SINAI AND GOLAN SETTLEMENTS. WEST BANK, GAZA, AND REFUGEE ISSUES WERE LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION.

5. THESE CONCEPTS ARE EMBODIED IN A WORKING PAPER WHICH IS A U.S. PROPOSAL THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT TO EXTENT WE CONSIDERED FEASIBLE THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. IT PROVIDES THAT AT OPENING SESSIONS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE THERE WILL BE A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION WHICH WILL INCLUDE PALESTINIANS. THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES REMAINS A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND THE PARTIES. ON THE QUESTION OF A CONFERENCE STRUCTURE, THE WORKING PAPER SUGGESTS THAT AFTER INITIAL PLENARY SESSIONS, IN WHICH ARAB SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY UNIFIED DELEGATION, CONFERENCE WOULD BREAK INTO WORKING GROUPS. THERE WOULD BE THREE BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS (ISRAEL-EGYPT, SYRIA-ISRAEL, JORDAN-ISRAEL) WITH FOURTH BILATERAL (ISRAEL-LEBANON) TO BE ADDED AT SUCH TIMES AS LEBANON REQUESTS TO JOIN THE CONFERENCE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS WEST BANK AND GAZA ON WHICH ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT AND PALESTINIANS WOULD BE REPRESENTED.

6. IDEA OF WORKING GROUP IN WHICH PALESTINIANS WOULD

BE INCLUDED HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT, AS WAS WHOLE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION. ISRAELI PREFERENCE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO DEAL WITH JORDAN CONCERNING WEST BANK, WITH PALESTINIANS TO BE PART OF JORDANIAN DELEGATION. ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF WORKING PAPER, AFTER INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE, THEREFORE REPRESENTED DIFFICULT CONCESSIONS FOR ISRAEL. CONFIDENTIAL

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7. WORKING PAPER TREATS REFUGEE ISSUE AS SEPARATE FROM ISSUE OF WEST BANK AND GAZA, TO BE DISCUSSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS YET TO BE AGREED UPON. HOWEVER, IT IS INCLUDED IN PAPER TO SHOW THAT PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY TERRITORIAL AGREEMENT ALONE; MANY PALESTINIANS ARE REFUGEES, AND THIS ASPECT HAS TO BE SOLVED AS WELL.

8. WORKING PAPER HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAELI CABINET, WE ARE NOW SEEKING AGREEMENT OF ARAB PARTIES. WE ARE STRESSING TO ALL CONCERNED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP FORMULATION ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS THAT FULLY MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT PARTIES MUST NOT ALLOW DIFFERENCES OVER PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CONVENING OF CONFERENCE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. OUR FEELING, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE NOW BEYOND PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO CONVENE CONFERENCE AND MOVE TO SUBSTANCE. ALTHOUGH PROCEDURE IS IMPORTANT, SEVERAL WEEKS OF DISCUSSION HAVE NARROWED PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES AND HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOME AMBIGUITY WILL HAVE TO REMAIN IF WE ARE TO GET OVER PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOME RISK IN GOING TO CONFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT WILL RESULT, WE SEE EVEN GREATER RISK IN FAILING TO HAVE CONFERENCE AT ALL.

9. WE ALSO SEE RISKS IN UN RESOLUTIONS AT THIS DELICATE STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN STRONGLY ENCOURAGING OTHERS NOT TO PRESS RESOLUTIONS OF THE KIND SOME DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. WE CONSIDER ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE RESOLUTION 242 AS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND EVEN EFFORT TO SUPPLEMENT RESOLUTION 242 WOULD RISK LOSING GENEVA, SINCE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338
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CONSTITUTE ONLY BASIS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND WORLD COMMUNITY GENERALLY HAVE ACCEPTED.

10. ALTHOUGH FOCUS OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS HAS BEEN ON BREAKING IMPASSE ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, OUR INTENSIVE

AND LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTIES IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK INCLUDED FURTHER EXPLORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT PARTIES WILL HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH AT GENEVA. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE WORTHWHILE; THEY HAVE GIVEN EACH SIDE CLEARER PICTURE OF WHERE OTHER STANDS ON CRUCIAL ISSUES, AND WILL ASSIST OUR OWN ROLE AT GENEVA IN TRYING TO HELP PARTIES BRIDGE DIFFERENCES. TO CERTAIN EXTENT ALSO, PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES THEMSELVES REFLECT UNDERLYING ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE ON WHICH PARTIES HAVE DEEPLY-HELD VIEWS.

11. HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPRESS INTEREST IN CONSIDERA-

TIONS WHICH LED TO OUR ISSUANCE OF JOINT STATEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON PRINCIPLES WHICH WE, AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, BELIEVE SHOULD GUIDE WORK OF CONFERENCE. THIS HAS GENERATED GOOD DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING BOTH IN U.S. AND ABROAD. DOCUMENT DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE FULL STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. IT DOES NOT FORESHADOW ANY U.S.-SOVIET ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. AND FINALLY, IT IS NOT A DOCUMENT THAT PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN ON TO AS PREREQUISITE FOR RECONVENING AT GENEVA.

12. JOINT STATEMENT DOES, HOWEVER, REFLECT AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WHO AS CO-CHAIRMEN HAVE TRIED TO HIGHLIGHT ISSUES PARTIES WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE
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THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT U.S. AND SOVIETS EXERCISE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AS CO-CHAIRMEN TO HELP MOVE PARTIES TOWARD GENEVA, ENCOURAGING PARTIES TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES THAT WILL BE NECESSARY IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE.

13. IN TERMS OF CONTENT, STATEMENT DOES NOT GO BEYOND PRINCIPLES REFLECTED EITHER IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 OR IN U.S. POLICY STATEMENTS. IT STICKS TO RESOLUTION 242 LANGUAGE ON FINAL BORDERS AND IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFINE HOW PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IS TO BE RESOLVED. ON OTHER HAND, WE CONSIDER IT POSITIVE ASSET THAT USSR AND U.S. HAVE SUBSCRIBED PUBLICLY IN AGREED DOCUMENT TO CONCEPT OF "NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS." AS FOR PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF PALESTINIANS, DEFINITION OF THESE RIGHTS IS LEFT TO NEGOTIATIONS. IN PAST WE DID NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THIS PHRASE BECAUSE IT WAS USED IN WAYS (E.G., IN UNGA RESOLUTIONS) THAT WERE AMBIGUOUS OR SILENT ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHTS. IN CONTEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT, IT IS CLEAR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED AT THE EXPENSE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS TO SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY. VANCE

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ORIGIN SSM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY: SSM:JTMCAANDREW:MA
APPROVED BY: SSM:CWKONTOS
NEA:MSTERNER

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R 180700Z OCT 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION SINAI 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOR SFM DIRECTOR HUNT

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION USUN, USNATO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BURSELS, BONN, ATHENS, ANKARA, TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TOKYO, LAGOS, OTTAWA, KHARTOUM, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, MANAMA, DOHA, MUSCAT, SANA, BAGHDAD, ALGIERS, BELGRADE INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, LONDON, PARIS, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM FROM STATE OCT 16:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

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2. BY WAY OF PUTTING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IN CONTEXT, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY'S FIRST TRIP TO AREA, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS BETWEEN MIDDLE EAST LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT, HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON EXPLORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO SEE IF SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT COULD BE DEFINED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BY TIME MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN MINISTERS CAME TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER, WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT COULD BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY NOW TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IS TO BRING THE PARTIES INTO NEGOTIATION WITH EACH OTHER AT GENEVA AND START A PROCESS OF GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE. TIME HAD COME, THEREFORE, TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING

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DELEGATION. ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF WORKING PAPER, AFTER INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE, THEREFORE REPRESENTED DIFFICULT CONCESSIONS FOR ISRAEL.

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11. HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPRESS INTEREST IN CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED TO OUR ISSUANCE OF JOINT STATEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON PRINCIPLES WHICH WE, AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, BELIEVE SHOULD GUIDE WORK OF CONFERENCE. THIS HAS GENERATED GOOD DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING BOTH IN U.S. AND ABROAD. DOCUMENT DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE FULL STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. IT DOES NOT FORESHADOW ANY U.S.-SOVIET ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. AND FINALLY, IT IS NOT A DOCUMENT THAT PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN ON TO AS PREREQUISITE FOR RECONVENING AT GENEVA.
CONFIDENTIAL

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ORIGIN EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-07 /014 R

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DRAFTED BY: EA/RA/FCBENNETT,JR/MJ

APPROVED BY: EA/RA:ROBERT J MARTENS

EA/TIMBS:DFIELD

NEA:RNEUMANN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SECSTATE WASHDC DATED OCTOBER 16,
1977 SENT SINAI IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOR SFM DIRECTOR HUNT

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION USUN, USNATO, THE HAGUE, ROME,
BURSSELS, BONN, ATHENS, ANKARA, TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
TOKYO, LAGOS, OTTAWA, KHARTOUM, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, BEIRUT,
KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, MANAMA, DOHA, MUSCAT, SANA, BAGHDAD,
ALGIERS, BELGRADE INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, LONDON, PARIS, DAMASCUS,
JIDDA, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM FROM STATE OCT 16:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, US

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SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

1. ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE TO
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NEGOTIATIONS, USDEL NATO MAY ALSO USE THIS AS BASIS FOR
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2. BY WAY OF PUTTING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IN CONTEXT, IT
WILL BE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY'S FIRST TRIP TO AREA, AS
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COULD BE DEFINED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BY TIME
MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN MINISTERS CAME TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER,

WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT COULD BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY NOW TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IS TO BRING THE PARTIES INTO NEGOTIATION WITH EACH OTHER AT GENEVA AND START A PROCESS OF GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE. TIME HAD COME, THEREFORE, TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING

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TO PLO PRESENCE IN ANY FORM WHATEVER AND ARABS WERE EQUALLY ADAMANT IN INSISTING PLO MUST BE REPRESENTED. ON QUESTION OF ORGANIZATION, ISRAEL AND EGYPT PREFERRED FORMAT OF BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA AND JORDAN PREFERRED MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUPS ORGANIZED TO DEAL WITH FUNCTIONAL ISSUES AND INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES PRESENT AT CONFERENCE.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IDEA OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION, IN WHICH PALESTINIANS WOULD BE PRESENT, SEEMED TO US TO OFFER POSSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING IMPASSE. ON QUESTION OF STRUCTURE OF CONFERENCE, WE FELT THAT COMBINATION OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE BEST WAY. SOME ISSUES LOGICALLY WERE BILATERAL, SUCH AS CONSIDERATION OF SINAI AND GOLAN SETTLEMENTS. WEST BANK, GAZA, AND REFUGEE ISSUES WERE LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION.

5. THESE CONCEPTS ARE EMBODIED IN A WORKING PAPER WHICH IS A U.S. PROPOSAL THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT TO EXTENT WE CONSIDERED FEASIBLE THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. IT PROVIDES THAT AT OPENING SESSIONS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE THERE WILL BE A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION WHICH WILL INCLUDE PALESTINIANS. THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES REMAINS A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND THE PARTIES. ON THE QUESTION OF A CONFERENCE STRUCTURE, THE WORKING PAPER SUGGESTS THAT AFTER INITIAL PLENARY SESSIONS, IN WHICH ARAB SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY UNIFIED DELEGATION, CONFERENCE WOULD BREAK INTO WORKING GROUPS. THERE WOULD BE THREE BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS (ISRAEL-EGYPT, SYRIA-ISRAEL, JORDAN-ISRAEL) WITH FOURTH BI-

LATERAL (ISRAEL-LEBANON) TO BE ADDED AT SUCH TIMES AS
LEBANON REQUESTS TO JOIN THE CONFERENCE. THERE WOULD
ALSO BE MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS WEST BANK
AND GAZA ON WHICH ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT AND PALESTINIANS
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WOULD BE REPRESENTED.

6. IDEA OF WORKING GROUP IN WHICH PALESTINIANS WOULD

BE INCLUDED HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT, AS
WAS WHOLE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION. ISRAELI
PREFERENCE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO DEAL WITH JORDAN CONCERNING
WEST BANK, WITH PALESTINIANS TO BE PART OF JORDANIAN
DELEGATION. ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF WORKING PAPER, AFTER
INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE, THEREFORE REPRESENTED DIFFICULT
CONCESSIONS FOR ISRAEL.

7. WORKING PAPER TREATS REFUGEE ISSUE AS SEPARATE FROM
ISSUE OF WEST BANK AND GAZA, TO BE DISCUSSED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS YET TO BE AGREED UPON. HOWEVER,
IT IS INCLUDED IN PAPER TO SHOW THAT PALESTINIAN PROBLEM
COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY TERRITORIAL AGREEMENT ALONE; MANY
PALESTINIANS ARE REFUGEES, AND THIS ASPECT HAS TO BE
SOLVED AS WELL.

8. WORKING PAPER HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAELI CABINET,
WE ARE NOW SEEKING AGREEMENT OF ARAB PARTIES. WE ARE
STRESSING TO ALL CONCERNED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE OVER PAST
SEVERAL WEEKS HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO DEVELOP FORMULATION ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS THAT
FULLY MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT
PARTIES MUST NOT ALLOW DIFFERENCES OVER PROCEDURE TO
PREVENT CONVENING OF CONFERENCE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS
CAN BEGIN ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. OUR FEELING, THEREFORE,
IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE NOW BEYOND PROCEDURE IN
ORDER TO CONVENE CONFERENCE AND MOVE TO SUBSTANCE.
ALTHOUGH PROCEDURE IS IMPORTANT, SEVERAL WEEKS OF
DISCUSSION HAVE NARROWED PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES AND HAVE
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MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOME AMBIGUITY WILL HAVE TO REMAIN
IF WE ARE TO GET OVER PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOME RISK IN
GOING TO CONFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTY ABOUT
WHAT WILL RESULT, WE SEE EVEN GREATER RISK IN FAILING
TO HAVE CONFERENCE AT ALL.

9. WE ALSO SEE RISKS IN UN RESOLUTIONS AT THIS DELICATE
STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN STRONGLY

ENCOURAGING OTHERS NOT TO PRESS RESOLUTIONS OF THE KIND SOME DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. WE CONSIDER ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE RESOLUTION 242 AS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND EVEN EFFORT TO SUPPLEMENT RESOLUTION 242 WOULD RISK LOSING GENEVA, SINCE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 CONSTITUTE ONLY BASIS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND WORLD COMMUNITY GENERALLY HAVE ACCEPTED.

10. ALTHOUGH FOCUS OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS HAS BEEN ON BREAKING IMPASSE ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, OUR INTENSIVE

AND LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTIES IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK INCLUDED FURTHER EXPLORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT PARTIES WILL HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH AT GENEVA. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE WORTHWHILE; THEY HAVE GIVEN EACH SIDE CLEARER PICTURE OF WHERE OTHER STANDS ON CRUCIAL ISSUES, AND WILL ASSIST OUR OWN ROLE AT GENEVA IN TRYING TO HELP PARTIES BRIDGE DIFFERENCES. TO CERTAIN EXTENT ALSO, PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES THEMSELVES REFLECT UNDERLYING ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE ON WHICH PARTIES HAVE DEEPLY-HELD VIEWS.

11. HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPRESS INTEREST IN CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED TO OUR ISSUANCE OF JOINT STATEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON PRINCIPLES WHICH WE, AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, BELIEVE SHOULD GUIDE WORK OF CONFERENCE. CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS HAS GENERATED GOOD DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING BOTH IN U.S. AND ABROAD. DOCUMENT DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE FULL STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. IT DOES NOT FORESHADOW ANY U.S.-SOVIET ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. AND FINALLY, IT IS NOT A DOCUMENT THAT PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN ON TO AS PREREQUISITE FOR RECONVENING AT GENEVA.

12. JOINT STATEMENT DOES, HOWEVER, REFLECT AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WHO AS CO-CHAIRMEN HAVE TRIED TO HIGHLIGHT ISSUES PARTIES WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT U.S. AND SOVIETS EXERCISE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AS CO-CHAIRMEN TO HELP MOVE PARTIES TOWARD GENEVA, ENCOURAGING PARTIES TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES THAT WILL BE NECESSARY IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE.

13. IN TERMS OF CONTENT, STATEMENT DOES NOT GO BEYOND PRINCIPLES REFLECTED EITHER IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 OR IN U.S. POLICY STATEMENTS. IT STICKS TO RESOLUTION 242 LANGUAGE ON FINAL BORDERS AND IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFINE HOW PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IS TO BE RESOLVED. ON OTHER HAND, WE CONSIDER IT POSITIVE

ASSET THAT USSR AND U.S. HAVE SUBSCRIBED PUBLICLY IN
AGREED DOCUMENT TO CONCEPT OF "NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS."
AS FOR PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF PALESTINIANS, DEFINI-
TION OF THESE RIGHTS IS LEFT TO NEGOTIATIONS. IN PAST WE
DID NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THIS PHRASE BECAUSE IT WAS USED IN
WAYS (E.G., IN UNGA RESOLUTIONS) THAT WERE AMBIGUOUS OR
SILENT ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHTS. IN CONTEXT OF JOINT STATE-
MENT, IT IS CLEAR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED
AT THE EXPENSE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS TO SOVEREIGNTY AND
SECURITY. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE
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APPROVED BY:NEA:MSTERNER

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TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SECSTATE DATED OCTOBER 7, 1977
SENT JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SECSTATE WASHDC DATED OCTOBER 16,
1977 SENT SINAI IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

FOR SFM DIRECTOR HUNT

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION USUN, USNATO, THE HAGUE, ROME,
BURSSELS, BONN, ATHENS, ANKARA, TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
TOKYO, LAGOS, OTTAWA, KHARTOUM, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, BEIRUT,
KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, MANAMA, DOHA, MUSCAT, SANA, BAGHDAD,
ALGIERS, BELGRADE INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, LONDON, PARIS, DAMASCUS,
JIDDA, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM FROM STATE OCT 16:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 248584

E.O. 11652: GDS

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TAGS: XF, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

1. ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR BRIEFINGS BY HOST GOVERNMENTS ON STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO IMPART NEW MOVEMENT TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, USDEL NATO MAY ALSO USE THIS AS BASIS FOR BRIEFING NAC.

2. BY WAY OF PUTTING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IN CONTEXT, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY'S FIRST TRIP TO AREA, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS BETWEEN MIDDLE EAST LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT, HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON EXPLORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO SEE IF SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT COULD BE DEFINED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BY TIME MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN MINISTERS CAME TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER, WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT COULD BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY NOW TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRSS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IS TO BRING THE PARTIES INTO NEGOTIATION WITH EACH OTHER AT GENEVA AND START A PROCESS OF GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE. TIME HAD COME, THEREFORE, TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE.

3. U.S. DEVELOPED SOME IDEAS ON TWO KEY QUESTIONS ON WHICH THERE HAS TO BE SOME AGREEMENT IN ORDER FOR GENEVA TO MEET: HOW PALESTINIANS ARE TO BE REPRESENTED, AND STRUCTURE OF CONFERENCE. PAPER WHICH WAS USED AS BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS EVOLVED IN LIGHT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS, IN WHICH WE SOUGHT FORMULATIONS TO

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MEET MINIMAL VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES. THERE WERE WIDE DIVERGENCIES; ISRAEL MADE CLEAR IT WAS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO PLO PRESENCE IN ANY FORM WHATEVER AND ARABS WERE EQUALLY ADAMANT IN INSISTING PLO MUST BE REPRESENTED. ON QUESTION OF ORGANIZATION, ISRAEL AND EGYPT PREFERRED FORMAT OF BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA AND JORDAN PREFERRED MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUPS ORGANIZED TO DEAL WITH FUNCTIONAL ISSUES AND INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES PRESENT AT CONFERENCE.

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5. THESE CONCEPTS ARE EMBODIED IN A WORKING PAPER WHICH IS A U.S. PROPOSAL THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT TO EXTENT WE CONSIDERED FEASIBLE THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. IT PROVIDES THAT AT OPENING SESSIONS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE THERE WILL BE A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION WHICH WILL INCLUDE PALESTINIANS. THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES REMAINS A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND THE PARTIES. ON THE QUESTION OF A CONFERENCE STRUCTURE, THE WORKING PAPER SUGGESTS THAT AFTER INITIAL PLENARY SESSIONS, IN WHICH ARAB SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY UNIFIED DELEGATION, CONFERENCE WOULD BREAK INTO WORKING GROUPS. THERE WOULD BE THREE BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS (ISRAEL-EGYPT, SYRIA-ISRAEL, JORDAN-ISRAEL) WITH FOURTH BILATERAL (ISRAEL-LEBANON) TO BE ADDED AT SUCH TIMES AS LEBANON REQUESTS TO JOIN THE CONFERENCE. THERE WOULD
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BE INCLUDED HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT, AS WAS WHOLE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION. ISRAELI PREFERENCE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO DEAL WITH JORDAN CONCERNING WEST BANK, WITH PALESTINIANS TO BE PART OF JORDANIAN DELEGATION. ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF WORKING PAPER, AFTER INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE, THEREFORE REPRESENTED DIFFICULT CONCESSIONS FOR ISRAEL.

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8. WORKING PAPER HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAELI CABINET, WE ARE NOW SEEKING AGREEMENT OF ARAB PARTIES. WE ARE STRESSING TO ALL CONCERNED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE

TO DEVELOP FORMULATION ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS THAT FULLY MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT PARTIES MUST NOT ALLOW DIFFERENCES OVER PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CONVENING OF CONFERENCE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. OUR FEELING, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE NOW BEYOND PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO CONVENE CONFERENCE AND MOVE TO SUBSTANCE.
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ALTHOUGH PROCEDURE IS IMPORTANT, SEVERAL WEEKS OF DISCUSSION HAVE NARROWED PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES AND HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOME AMBIGUITY WILL HAVE TO REMAIN IF WE ARE TO GET OVER PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOME RISK IN GOING TO CONFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT WILL RESULT, WE SEE EVEN GREATER RISK IN FAILING TO HAVE CONFERENCE AT ALL.

9. WE ALSO SEE RISKS IN UN RESOLUTIONS AT THIS DELICATE STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN STRONGLY ENCOURAGING OTHERS NOT TO PRESS RESOLUTIONS OF THE KIND SOME DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. WE CONSIDER ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE RESOLUTION 242 AS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND EVEN EFFORT TO SUPPLEMENT RESOLUTION 242 WOULD RISK LOSING GENEVA, SINCE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 CONSTITUTE ONLY BASIS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND WORLD COMMUNITY GENERALLY HAVE ACCEPTED.

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AT THE EXPENSE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS TO SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

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Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
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Expiration:
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Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Subject: BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, XF, US
To: USUN N Y USNATO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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22 May 2009
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